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Abstract
It is well known that the Penrose-Banzhaf index of a weighted game can differ starkly from cor-
responding weights. Limit results are quite the opposite, i.e., under certain conditions the power
distribution approaches the weight distribution. Here we provide parametric examples that give
necessary conditions for the existence of limit results for the Penrose-Banzhaf index.
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1 Introduction
Consider a private limited company with four shareholders. Assume that the shares are
given by (0.42, 0.40, 0.09, 0.09) and that decisions are drawn by simple majority rule. The
shares suggest that the influence on company decisions is similar for the first two and the last
two shareowners. However, a proposal can be enforced either by shareholders 2, 3, 4 or by
shareholder 1 with the support of at least one of the others. Thus, restricting the analysis to
shares and the decision rule, the three later shareowners have equal say, which is not reflected
by the magnitude of shares at all. In order to evaluate influence in such decision environments,
power indices like the Penrose-Banzhaf index [1, 9], the Shapley-Shubik index [12], or the
nucleolus [11] were introduced. In our example the corresponding power distributions are given
by (1
2
, 1
6
, 1
6
, 1
6
), (1
2
, 1
6
, 1
6
, 1
6
), and (2
5
, 1
5
, 1
5
, 1
5
), respectively. So, our example is just an instance of
the well known fact that relative weights can differ starkly from the corresponding power
distribution. However, under certain conditions, weights and power are almost equal, which is
studied under the term limit results for power indices in the literature. An early example was
mentioned by Penrose in 1952, see the appendix of [9]. Roughly speaking, if a certain quantity,
now known as the Laakso-Taagepera index [5] or Herfindahl-Hirschman index, is large, then
for simple majority the weights are a good approximation for the Penrose-Banzhaf index. For
a specific interpretation of the term “good approximation”, a proof of some special cases and
counter examples have been given in [6] and [7], respectively. Here we study a wider range
of measures for deviation and provide parametric examples that give necessary conditions for
the existence of limit results for the Penrose-Banzhaf index.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. After introducing the necessary
preliminaries in Section 2, we present our main results in Section 3 and set them into context.
Auxiliary results and lengthy proofs are moved to an appendix.
2 Preliminaries
For a positive integer n let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players. A simple game is a mapping
v : 2N → {0, 1} with v(∅) = 0, v(N) = 1, and v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N . We call
1
S ⊆ N\{i} an i-swing if v(S) = 0, v(S ∪ {i}) = 1 and denote the number of i-swings in
v by ηi(v). Setting η(v) =
∑
i∈N ηi(v), the Penrose-Banzhaf index of player i is given by
BZIi(v) = ηi(v)/η(v). The Shapley-Shubik index is given by the following weighted counting
of swings
SSIi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|! · (n− |S| − 1)!
n!
· (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)) .
The nucleolus Nuc(v) can be defined as the unique solution of an optimization problem, see
[11] for the details.
A simple game v is weighted if there exists a quota q ∈ R>0 and weights w ∈ R
n
≥0 such
that v(S) = 1 iff w(S) ≥ q, where w(S) :=
∑
i∈S wi. We write v = [q;w] and speak of relative
or normalized weights if w(N) = 1. By ∆(w) = max{wi : i ∈ N} and Λ(w) = max{wi/wj :
i, j ∈ N,wi, wj 6= 0} we denote the maximum weight and the span (of weight vector w),
respectively.
For a vector x ∈ Rn we write ‖x‖1 =
∑n
i=1 |xi|, ‖x‖∞ = max {|xi| : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, and
‖x‖p = (
∑
i=1n |xi|
p)
1/p
for p ≥ 1. Each such norm ‖ · ‖ induces a distance function via
d(x, y) = ‖x − y‖. For all x ∈ Rn and all 1 ≤ p ≤ p′ we have ‖x‖∞ ≤ ‖x‖p′ ≤ ‖x‖p ≤ ‖x‖1,
i.e., ‖ · ‖1 and ‖ · ‖∞ are the extreme cases on which we focus here. For normalized weight
vectors, i.e., w,w′ ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = ‖w
′‖1 = 1, the inequality ‖w − w
′‖∞ ≤ ‖w − w
′‖1 can
be strengthened to ‖w − w′‖∞ ≤ ‖w − w
′‖1/2, see Lemma 4.
3 Approximation results
Before we start to discuss approximation results between weights and the Penrose-Banzhaf
index we briefly review the known results for the Shapley-Shubik index and the nucleolus.
Neyman’s main result of [8] implies as a special case:
Theorem 1. For each ε > 0 there exist constants δ > 0 and K > 0 such that for each n ∈ N,
q ∈ (0, 1) and w ∈ Rn with ‖w‖1 = 1, ∆(w) < δ, and K∆(w) < q < 1 − K∆(w), we have
‖ SSI([q;w])− w‖1 < ε.
In words, the Shapley-Shubik index of a weighted game is close to relative weights if the
maximum weight is small and the quota is not too near to the boundary points 0 or 1. We
remark that the maximum relative weight is small if and only if the Laakso-Taagepera index
of w is large, see Lemma 5 for the precise details. Invoking conditions on the maximum weight
and the quota is indeed necessary for any power index ϕ.
Proposition 1. ([3, Proposition 1]) Let ϕ be a mapping from the set of weighted games (on
n players) into Rn≥0.
(i) For each q ∈ (0, 1] and each integer n ≥ 2 there exists a weighted game [q;w], where
w ∈ Rn≥0 and ‖w‖1 = 1, such that ‖w − ϕ([q;w])‖1 ≥
1
3
and ‖w − ϕ([q;w])‖∞ ≥
1
6
.
(ii) For each ∆ ∈ (0, 1) and each integer n ≥ 4
3∆
+ 6 there exists a weighted game [q;w],
where q ∈ (0, 1], w ∈ Rn≥0, ‖w‖1 = 1, and ∆(w) = ∆, such that ‖w − ϕ([q;w])‖1 ≥
1
3
,
and ‖w − ϕ([q;w])‖∞ ≥ ∆/4.
2
The underlying reason is that different representations of the same weighted game have to
be mapped onto to same power vector, i.e., the diameter of the polytope of representations of
a weighted game plays the key role, as exploited in [3].
While the functional dependence for δ and K on ε is hidden in the existence arguments of
the proofs of [8], a more explicit statement for the nucleolus was obtained in [4]:
Theorem 2. For q ∈ (0, 1), w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = 1 we have ‖Nuc([q;w])−w‖1 ≤
2∆(w)
min{q,1−q}
.
For the Penrose-Banzhaf index an analog of Theorem 1 is impossible.
Proposition 2. Let
vn = [n
3 + n2; 2n2,
2n3︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1].
Then ‖w‖1 = 1, vn = [
1
2
;w], and for n ≥ 11 we have
‖BZI(vn)− w‖1 ≥ 2−
4
n
and ‖BZI(vn)− w‖∞ ≥ 1−
2
n
.
For any given constants δ and K we can choose n large enough such that ∆(vn) < δ and
K∆(vn) < q < 1 −K∆(vn) since ∆(vn) =
1
n
and q = 1
2
. Thus, ‖BZI(vn)− w‖1 > ε for ε < 1
and n ≥ 11 sufficiently large.
Note that for any x, x′ ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖x‖1 = ‖x
′‖1 = 1 we have ‖x − x
′‖∞ ≤ 1 and
‖x− x′‖∞ ≤ 2, i.e., for large n the disparity between BZI(vn) and the stated relative weights
is as large as it could be for arbitrary vectors.
For the Penrose-Banzhaf index we have the following limit theorem, see [6].
Theorem 3. Let W˜ be a finite set of non-negative integers, W ⊆ W˜ be a finite set of positive
integers with greatest common divisor 1, ρ ∈ R>0, and (wi)i∈N be a sequence with wi ∈ W˜ for
all i ∈ N such that {i ∈ N : wi ∈ W˜\W} is finite and
∑
i∈{1≤j≤n :wj=a}
wi ≥ ρ ·
∑
1≤i≤nwi for
all a ∈ W and all sufficiently large n. Then,
lim
n→∞
BZIi
([
1
2
, w(n)
])
BZIj
([
1
2
, w(n)
]) = wi
wj
(1)
for all integers i, j with wi, wj ∈ W , where w
(n)
h = wh/
∑n
l=1wl denotes the relative weight.
Since Equation (1) is a statement about the ratio between the Penrose-Banzhaf indices of
two players whose weights are attained infinitely often, it is trivially satisfied in the example
of Proposition 2. So, we give another parametric example.
Proposition 3. Let
vn = [3n
3 + n2;
2n+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
2n2, . . . , 2n2,
2n3︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1].
Relative weights for a relative quota of 1
2
are given by w = (2n2, . . . , 2n2, 1, . . . , 1) /(6n3+2n2),
i.e., ‖w‖1 = 1 and vn = [
1
2
;w]. For n ≥ 11 we have BZI1(vn)/BZI2n+2(vn) ≥ 2.6
n/(2n + 1)
and ‖BZI(vn)− w‖1 ≥
1
5
.
3
Here we only have two types of players which we call large and small. The weight fraction
of the small players tends to 1
3
as n increases and the maximum relative weight tends to zero.
Nevertheless the ratio between the Penrose-Banzhaf powers of large and small players grows
exponentially faster than the ratio between their weights. Of course this does not contradict
Theorem 3 since W is assumed to be finite. It was also noted in [2, Section 10] that the
Penrose-Banzhaf index of [q;w] can behave strangely if the span Λ(w) grows without bound.
To that end we state:
Conjecture 1. There exists a constant C > 0 such that for each w ∈ Rn>0 with ‖w‖1 = 1 we
have
‖BZI([1
2
;w])− w‖1 ≤ C ·∆(w) · Λ(w).
At this place it is appropriate to discuss the relation between approximation errors in the
‖ · ‖1 norm and relative deviations as in Theorem 3.
Lemma 1. Let x, w ∈ Rn≥0 with xj = xh for all 1 ≤ j, h ≤ n with wj = wh.
(a) If ‖x− w‖1 ≤ ε, then
1−
ε
αi
≤
xi
wi
≤ 1 +
ε
αi
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n with wi > 0, where Si = {1 ≤ j ≤ n : wi = wj} and αi = w(Si).
(b) If wi, wj, xi, xj 6= 0, εi, εj ∈ [0, 1) with 1 − εi ≤
xi
wi
≤ 1 + εi and 1 − εj ≤
xj
wj
≤ 1 + εj,
then
1− εi
1 + εj
≤
wi
wj
·
xj
xi
≤
1 + εi
1− εj
and
∣∣∣∣ xiwi − xjwj
∣∣∣∣ ≤ εi + εj.
Proof. Only part (a) is non-trivial. If xi/wi > 1 + ε/αi or xi/wi < 1− ε/αi then
‖x− w‖1 ≥
∑
j∈Si
|xj − wj| = |Si| · |xi − wi| > |Si| · wi · ε/αi = ε,
a contradiction.
So, if ‖x− w‖1 is small, then xi/wi is near to 1 and xi/xj is near to wi/wj provided that
the numbers are non-zero and the involved players each belong to a family of players with
equal weights and non-vanishing weight share. Assumptions on x, i.e., non-negativity and
symmetry, are rather mild and satisfied by any published power index. If true, Conjecture 1
would imply Theorem 3. Indeed a small relative deviation is a tighter assumption than a small
‖ · ‖1 distance.
Lemma 2. Let S ⊆ N = {1, . . . , n}, εˆ, ε˜, ε ∈ R>0, and x, w ∈ R
n with w(N) ≤ 1, w(N\S) ≤
εˆ, x(N\S) ≤ ε˜, and 1− ε ≤ xi/wi ≤ 1 + ε for all i ∈ S, then ‖x− w‖1 ≤ εˆ+ ε˜+ ε.
Proof. Let S+ = {i ∈ S : xi ≥ wi} and S
− = {i ∈ S : xi < wi}, then
‖x− w‖1 =
∑
i∈N\{i}
|xi − wi|+
(
x(S+)− w(S+)
)
+
(
w(S−)− x(S−)
)
≤ w(N\S) + x(N\S) + w(S) · ε ≤ εˆ+ ε˜+ ε.
4
In words, if we assume a small relative deviation for all players except a subset of players
with a small mass in terms of x and w, then the ‖ · ‖1 distance is small.
So far we have always assumed a relative quota of q = 1
2
for the Penrose-Banzhaf index.
For q ∈ (0, 1]\1
2
we can consider the weighted game vn,q = [q · 3n; 2, . . . , 2, 1, . . . , 1] with n
players of weight 2 and another n players of weight 1. For each quota q there exists a constant
ε > 0 such that ‖BZI(vn,q) − wn,q‖1 ≥ ε for all sufficiently large n, where wn,q denotes the
corresponding relative weight vector, see Proposition 4 in the appendix for a more refined
statement. Lemma 2 implies that the ratio between the Penrose-Banzhaf power of players of
weight 2 and players of weight 1 does not converge to 2. This example also implies that we
cannot have an upper bound of the form
‖BZI([q;w])− w‖1 ≤
C ·∆(w)α · Λ(w)β
min{q, 1− q}γ
for each q ∈ (0, 1), w ∈ Rn>0 with ‖w‖1 = 1, where C, α, β, γ ∈ R>0 are arbitrary constants.
So, there is little room for limit results for the Penrose-Banzhaf index for quotas q 6= 1
2
.
With respect to the Shapley-Shubik index we state:
Conjecture 2. For each q ∈ (0, 1) and w ∈ Rn>0 with ‖w‖1 = 1 we have
‖ SSI([q;w])− w‖1 ≤
5∆(w)
min{q, 1− q}
.
We remark that Conjecture 2 is valid for all of our three parametric examples.
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Appendix
In order to prove Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 we need a small numerical estimate and a
tightening of the general bound ‖x‖∞ ≤ ‖x‖1 in our setting.
Lemma 3. For n ≥ 11 we have 2n3/2.6n ≤ 1
n
.
Proof. Let f(n) = 2n4/2.6n. Since f ′(n) = −2n3(n ln(2.6)− 4)/2.6n and n ln(2.6)− 4 > 0 for
n > 4.19, we have f ′(n) < 0. Thus, f(n) ≤ f(11) < 1 for n ≥ 11.
Lemma 4. For w,w′ ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = ‖w
′‖1 = 1, we have ‖w − w
′‖∞ ≤
1
2
‖w − w′‖1.
Proof. With S := {1 ≤ i ≤ n | wi ≤ w
′
i} and A :=
∑
i∈S (w
′
i − wi), B :=
∑
i∈N\S (wi − w
′
i),
where N = {1, . . . , n}, we have A − B = 0 since ‖w‖1 = ‖w
′‖1 and w,w
′ ∈ Rn≥0. Thus,
‖w − w′‖1 = 2A and ‖w − w
′‖∞ ≤ max{A,B} = A.
Proof of Proposition 2. We easily check ‖w‖1 = 1 and vn = [
1
2
;w]. For v = [q; k, 1, . . . , 1] with
m times weight 1 we have η1(v) =
∑k
i=1
(
m
q−i
)
and η2(v) =
(
m−1
q−1
)
+
(
m−1
q−k−1
)
so that
η1(vn) =
2n2∑
i=1
(
2n3
n3 + n2 − i
)
≥
(
2n3
n3
)
and
η2(vn) =
(
2n3 − 1
n3 + n2 − 1
)
+
(
2n3 − 1
n3 − n2 − 1
)
=
(
2n3 − 1
n3 + n2 − 1
)
+
(
2n3 − 1
n3 + n2
)
=
(
2n3
n3 + n2
)
using q = n3 + n2, k = 2n2, and m = 2n3.
Since (1 + 1
n
)n is monotonically increasing we have (1 + 1
n
)n ≥ 2.6 for n ≥ 11, so that
η1(vn)
η2(vn)
≥
(n3 + n2)! (n3 − n2)!
(n3)! (n3)!
=
n2∏
i=1
n3 + i
n2∏
i=1
n3 + i− n2
≥
(
1 +
n2
n3
)n2
=
((
1 + 1
n
)n)n
≥ 2.6n.
From
BZI1(vn) =
η1(vn)
η1(vn) +m · η2(vn)
= 1−
m · η2(vn)
η1(vn) +m · η2(vn)
≥ 1−m ·
η2(vn)
η1(vn)
≥ 1−
2n3
2.6n
,
w1 =
1
n+1
≤ 1
n
, and 2n3/2.6n ≤ 1
n
for n ≥ 11, see Lemma 3, we deduce
‖BZI(vn)− w‖∞ ≥ |BZI1(vn)− w1| ≥ 1−
2
n
.
From Lemma 4 we then conclude ‖BZI(vn)− w‖1 ≥ 2−
4
n
. 
Proof of Proposition 3. We easily check ‖w‖1 = 1 and vn = [
1
2
;w]. For players 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n+ 1
examples of swing coalitions are given by n other players of weight 2n2 and n3 players of
weight 1, so that
ηi(vn) ≥
(
2n
n
)
·
(
2n3
n3
)
.
6
For players of weight 1, i.e., 2n+ 2 ≤ i ≤ 2n+ 1 + 2n3, we have
ηi(vn) =
2n+1∑
j=0
(
2n+ 1
j
)
·
(
2n3 − 1
3n3 + n2 − j · 2n2 − 1
)
≤ (n+ 1) ·
(
2n+ 1
n
)
·
(
2n3 − 1
n3 − n2 − 1
)
+ (n+ 1) ·
(
2n+ 1
n
)
·
(
2n3 − 1
n3 + n2 − 1
)
= (n+ 1) ·
(
2n+ 1
n
)
·
(
2n3
n3 + n2
)
= (2n+ 1) ·
(
2n
n
)
·
(
2n3
n3 + n2
)
Similar as in the proof of Proposition 2 we conclude
BZI1(vn)
BZI2n+2(vn)
=
η1(vn)
η2n+2(vn)
≥
2.6n
2n+ 1
,
noting that η1(vn) = ηi(vn) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n + 2 and η2n+2(vn) = ηi(vn) for all 2n + 2 ≤
2n+ 1 + 2n3 due to symmetry. With this we compute
BZI1(vn)− w1 =
η1(vn)
(2n+ 1) · η1(vn) + 2n3 · η2n+2(vn)
−
1
3n + 1
=
1
2n + 1
·
(
1−
2n3 · η2n+2(vn)
(2n+ 1) · η1(vn) + 2n3 · η2n+2(vn)
)
−
1
3n + 1
≥
1
2n + 1
·
(
3
10
−
2n3
2n+ 1
·
η2n+2(vn)
η1(vn)
)
≥
1
2n + 1
·
(
1
2
−
2n3
2.6n
)
≥
1
2n+ 1
·
(
3
10
−
1
n
)
≥
1
2n + 1
·
1
5
for n ≥ 11 (using Lemma 3). Thus
‖BZI(vn)− w‖1 ≥
2n+1∑
i=1
|BZIi(vn)− wi| = (2n+ 1) · |BZI1(vn)− w1| ≥
1
5
. 
The details for our briefly sketched last example from Section 3 are given by:
Proposition 4. For n ∈ N and q ∈ [0, 1] let
vn,q = [q · 3n;
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
2, . . . , 2,
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1]
with n times weight 2 and n times weight 1. Relative weights for a relative quota of q are given
by wn,q = (2, . . . , 2, 1, . . . , 1) /(3n), i.e., ‖wn,q‖1 = 1 and vn,q = [q;wn,q]. Then the function
f(q) := limn→∞ ‖BZI(vn,q) − wn,q‖1 satisfies f(q) = f(1 − q) ∈ [0,
1
3
] for all q ∈ [0, 1] and is
strictly monotonically increasing in [1
2
, 1].
We refrain from giving a rigorous proof. Symmetry around q = 1
2
, i.e., f(q) = f(1 − q)
follows by considering the dual game. For a relative quota q near 0 or near 1 all players are
equivalent so that BZI(vn,q) =
1
2n
· (1, . . . , 1), which gives f(0) = f(1) = 1
3
. From [6, Theorem
7
3.6] we conclude f(1
2
) = 0. In order to check the existence of the limit and monotonicity
numerically we state
η1(vn,q) =
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
·
(
n− 1
⌈q · 3n⌉ − 2i− 1
)
ηn+1(vn,q) =
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
·
((
n
⌈q · 3n⌉ − 2i− 2
)
+
(
n
⌈q · 3n⌉ − 2i− 1
))
=
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
·
(
n + 1
⌈q · 3n⌉ − 2i− 1
)
noting that convergence is rather slow and requires high precision computations. We remark
that error bounds in general local limit theorems for lattice distributions like e.g. [10, Theorem
2 in Chapter VII] are (inevitably) too weak in order to determine f(q) analytically. While
the summands of η1(vn,q) and ηn+1(vn,q) are unimodal and quickly sloping outside a small
neighborhood around the almost coinciding peaks, the intuitive idea to bound the sums in
terms of their maximal summands is not too easy to pursue. The maximal summand is not
attained at i ≈ q · n, as one could expect. Even approximating log2
(
n
k
)
by n ·H(k/n), where
H(p) = −p log2(p) − (1 − p) log2(1 − p) is the binary entropy of p, gives that the maximum
summand is attained for i ≈ n · g(q), where
g(q) =
g˜(q)
1
3
12
−
−3q2 + 3q + 1
2
g˜(q)
1
3
+ q
and
g˜(q) = −216q3 + 324q2 − 108q + 6
√
972q4 − 1944q3 + 864q2 + 108q + 6.
Numerically we can check that this fancy function g satisfies q ≤ g(q) ≤ 1.07 · g(q) for all
1
2
≤ q ≤ 1 and is, of course, symmetric to q = 1
2
.
Given the numerical results for f(q) we can state that 8
3
·
∣∣q − 1
2
∣∣3 and 1
3
−H(q)/3 log2(2)
correspond to curves that look similar to f(q) and have a rather small absolute error.
For w ∈ Rn≥0 with w 6= 0 the Laakso-Taagepera index is given by
L(w) =
(
n∑
i=1
wi
)2
/
n∑
i=1
w2i .
In general we have 1 ≤ L(w) ≤ n. If the weight vector w is normalized, then the formula
simplifies to L(w) = 1/
∑n
i=1w
2
i . Under the name “effective number of parties” the index is
widely used in political science to measure party fragmentation, see, e.g., [5]. We observe the
following relations between the maximum relative weight ∆ = ∆(w) and the Laakso-Taagepera
index L(w):
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Lemma 5. [3, Lemma 3] For w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = 1, we have
1
∆
≤
1
∆ (1− α(1− α)∆)
≤ L(w) ≤
1
∆2 + (1−∆)
2
n−1
≤
1
∆2
for n ≥ 2, where α := 1
∆
−
⌊
1
∆
⌋
∈ [0, 1). If n = 1, then ∆ = L(w) = 1.
Proof. The key idea is to optimize
n∑
i=1
w2i with respect to the constraints w ∈ R
n, ‖w‖1 = 1,
and ∆(w) = ∆.
For n = 1, we have w1 = 1, ∆(w) = 1, α = 0, and L(w) = 1, so that we assume n ≥ 2 in the
remaining part of the proof. For wi ≥ wj consider a :=
wi+wj
2
and x := wi−a, so that wi = a+x
and wj = a−x. With this we have w
2
i+w
2
j = 2a
2+2x2 and (wi+y)
2+(wj−y)
2 = 2a2+2(x+y)2.
Let us assume that w⋆ minimizes
∑n
i=1w
2
i under the conditions w ∈ R≥0, ‖w‖1 = 1, and
∆(w) = ∆. (Since the target function is continuous and the feasible set is compact and
non-empty, a global minimum indeed exists.) W.l.o.g. we assume w⋆1 = ∆. If there are
indices 2 ≤ i, j ≤ n with w⋆i > w
⋆
j , i.e., x > 0 in the above parameterization, then we may
choose y = −x. Setting w′i := w
⋆
i + y = a =
w⋆
i
+w⋆
j
2
, w′j := w
⋆
j − y = a =
w⋆
i
+w⋆
j
2
, and
w′h := w
⋆
h for all 1 ≤ h ≤ n with h /∈ {i, j}, we have w
′ ∈ Rn≥0, ‖w
′‖1 = 1, ∆(w
′) = ∆,
and
∑n
h=1 (w
′
h)
2 =
∑n
h=1 (w
⋆
h)
2 − x2. Since this contradicts the minimality of w⋆, we have
w⋆i = w
⋆
j for all 2 ≤ i, j ≤ n, so that we conclude w
⋆
i =
1−∆
n−1
for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n from
1 = ‖w⋆‖1 =
n∑
h=1
w⋆h. Thus, L(w) ≤ 1/
(
∆2 + (1−∆)
2
n−1
)
, which is tight. Since ∆ ≤ 1 and n ≥ 2,
we have 1/
(
∆2 + (1−∆)
2
n−1
)
≤ 1
∆2
, which is tight if and only if ∆ = 1, i.e., n− 1 of the weights
have to be equal to zero.
Now, let us assume that w maximizes
∑n
i=1w
2
i under the conditions w ∈ R≥0, ‖w‖1 = 1,
and ∆(w) = ∆. (Due to the same reason a global maximum indeed exists.) Due to 1 =
‖w‖1 ≤ n∆ we have 0 < ∆ ≤ 1/n, where ∆ = 1/n implies wi = ∆ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In
that case we have L(w) = n and α = 0, so that the stated lower bounds for L(w) are valid.
In the remaining cases we assume ∆ > 1/n. If there would exist two indices 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n
with wi ≥ wj, wi < ∆, and wj > 0, we may strictly increase the target function by moving
weight from wj to wi (this corresponds to choosing y > 0), by an amount small enough to
still satisfy the constraints wi ≤ ∆ and wj ≥ 0. Since ∆ > 0, we can set a := ⌊1/∆⌋ ≥ 0
with a ≤ n − 1 due to ∆ > 1/n. Thus, for a maximum solution, we have exactly a weights
that are equal to ∆, one weight that is equal to 1 − a∆ ≥ 0 (which may indeed be equal to
zero), and n − a − 1 weights that are equal to zero. With this and a∆ = 1 − α∆ we have∑n
i=1w
2
i = a∆
2(1− a∆)2 = ∆−α∆2+α2∆2 = ∆(1−α∆+α2∆) = ∆(1− α(1− α)∆) ≤ ∆.
Here, the latter inequality is tight if and only if α = 0, i.e., 1/∆ ∈ N.
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